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Contemporary derivatives mark the development 
of capital and constitute a novel form of owner-
ship. By reconfiguring the temporal, spatial and 
legal character of ownership derivatives present a 
substantive challenge to the tax collecting state. 
While fiscal systems are nationally bounded and 
inherently static, capital itself is unprecedentedly 
mobile, fluid and fungible. As such derivatives 
raise the specter of ‘financial weapons of mass 
destruction’.
Introduction
Since the eruption of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
two particular policy debates have risen to the top of the 
agenda. One debate was crystallised in the former head 
of the UK Financial Services Authority, Adair Turner’s 
comment that the financial sector had, ‘swollen beyond 
its socially useful size… I think some of it is socially use-
less activity’ (Turner 2009: 1). The Turner Review had 
previously pointed to a financial sector blinded by faith 
in sophisticated mathematics and the efficient market 
hypothesis, which had become overblown, over lever-
aged, over speculative, pro-cyclical and under-regulated 
(FSA 2009: 11-49). At the same time as politicians were 
echoing this analysis of the malaise of global finance, an 
orchestrated attack was launched against the world of ‘tax 
havens’. In April 2009, a G20 communique announced 
the intention to take action against non-cooperative juris-
dictions known parochially as ‘tax havens’1. The leaders of 
the G20 nations proclaimed themselves ‘ready to deploy 
sanctions to protect [their] public finances and financial 
systems’, and declared that ‘the era of banking secrecy is 
over’ (G20 2009: 4). In the context of widespread aus-
terity policies, both debates have persisted and a host of 
regulatory initiatives, more or less effective, have been 
launched. However, while both debates have been intense 
and persistent, they have remained largely distinct. De-
spite the G20 statement implicitly linking the problem 
of adequate public funding to that of the stable provision 
and allocation of credit, the conversation about the finan-
cial system has largely by-passed that about fiscal systems. 
International Political Economy has no less failed to 
forge the link between financial innovation, tax avoid-
ance and the fiscal crisis of the state. The literature on 
what is now widely known as ‘the offshore world’ (Palan 
2003) has concentrated on the historical development of 
the international tax architecture, the institutional basis 
of that architecture in nationally circumscribed mutually 
exclusive fiscal sovereignty under conditions of economic 
globalisation, the impact of ‘tax havens’ on developing 
countries and multilateral policy efforts to regulate activi-
ties in offshore jurisdictions (Burn 1999; Eccleston 2012; 
Kurdle 2010; Rixen; Palan, Chavagneux and Murphy 
2010; Picciotto 1992; Sharman 2006; 2012; Leaman and 
Warris 2013) This is despite evidence that financial inno-
vation in the form of structured finance2 and derivatives 
is in good part driven by the tax advantages that it can 
create. Early on, the noble laureate Merton Miller, a lead-
ing derivative architect and doyen of the Chicago School, 
emphasised regulatory and tax ‘frictions’ in explaining fi-
nancial innovation (1986). In turn, John Finnerty (1988: 
18), one of the first to recognize the shift from finance 
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as analytical science to finance as engineering science, 
famously proposed three criteria for financial innova-
tion; innovation must reduce or reallocate risk to lower 
the required offering yield (cost of credit), lower issuance 
expenses (cost of financial production), or create a tax 
arbitrage opportunity (cost of political geography). ‘Fi-
nancial innovations symbolise the profit-driven response 
to the [sic] changes in the economic, regulatory and tax 
environment’ (Finnerty 1988: 31). 
The advantages of combining the political economic 
analysis of financial innovation and the offshore do not 
rest purely on the empirical level. Knowledge of the role 
of derivatives in tax planning remains in large cocooned 
within a limited sphere of financial practitioners and legal 
experts, and requires the acquisition of a jargon and ex-
pertise endemic to the markets. For most, how derivatives 
are used to create tax advantages is a black box. Complex-
ity, opacity and secrecy constitute formidable barriers to 
entry. Nor is the combination entirely policy motivated. 
In the context of large developed states attempts to repair 
leaking and emaciated fiscal systems the issue carries ur-
gent and developing policy significance (HMRC 2013; 
JCT 2011; JCT 2013). In addition to making an empiri-
cal and policy contribution, this article is motivated by 
the need to broaden the analysis of offshore to incorporate 
spaces which are not sovereign nation states, but rather the 
product of technical innovations in the private sphere. Er-
rant policy and rogue states are not the only issue here. Fi-
nancial innovations which rearticulate relations between 
fiscal and financial systems call for attention and Warren 
Buffet’s famous warning in relation to the then emergent 
credit derivatives market, that derivatives are potentially 
‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ (2002: 16) might 
be usefully reposed as derivatives are ‘fiscal weapons of 
mass destruction’. Derivatives corrode both the capacity 
to collect tax due and the categories and concepts upon 
which fiscal claims are constructed. A second motivation 
lies in according derivatives historic significance (Bryan 
and Rafferty 2006; Wigan 2009: 158). Derivatives mark 
the evolution of ownership and in doing so reconfigure 
the materiality of finance. Ownership via abstraction has 
transcended national containers and garnered unprece-
dented and diffuse disciplinary power over the state, and 
in turn labour (cf. Bryan, Martin and Rafferty 2010). A 
conflict between the fiscal state and financial innovation 
embodies a deeper structural shift wherein capital has 
evolved beyond its national imaginary.
In making the argument that derivatives ownership 
challenges and potentially transcends the fiscal capacity 
of the state the paper is organized in three subsequent 
sections. Section one briefly provides some basic facts and 
figures about financial derivatives to facilitate navigation 
of the argument then argues for a conceptualisation of 
derivatives as a new form of ownership. The second sec-
tion outlines the characteristics of this form of ownership, 
which lend derivatives their utility in tax avoidance. The 
section illustrates this by drawing upon two high profile 
cases where the use of derivatives to minimize tax expo-
sures has come to light. The concluding section discusses 
the implications of the use of derivatives for tax minimi-
zation for understanding financial innovation, financial 
systems and the evolution of capital. Financial derivatives 
attract scorn, as instruments of speculation, which desta-
bilize markets and generate crises, and admiration, as the 
means to market perfection. Understood through the lens 
of this polemic dichotomy, financial derivatives are either 
the perverse manifestation of a casino economy or the 
latest manifestation of a simple evolutionary progress to-
wards complete and perfect markets. This article accords 
derivatives a historic significance, which transcends the 
bounds of this debate.
Derivatives and Ownership
Financial derivatives, which emerged in the immedi-
ate wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
as a mechanism to harness and navigate the volatility of 
market driven finance, are contracts the value of which 
derives from the performance of underlying securities 
prices, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodities 
and market indexes. Exchange Traded (ET) derivatives 
are standardised contracts traded on organised exchanges 
and rest upon the provision of a guarantee by a clearing 
house. The clearing house stands between the buyer and 
seller of the contract, collecting margin payments from 
contract counterparties according to the performance of 
the underlying asset. At the outset of the GFC counter-
party risk - or the risk that you won’t get paid – in the 
over- the-counter (OTC) credit derivative market caused 
global financial markets to simultaneously seize up on 
news of the collapse of the U.S. investment bank, Lehman 
Brothers. In the wake of the GFC a concerted effort has 
been made to push the derivative trade onto variously 
designed organized exchanges in order to mitigate the 
opaque counterparty risk that was so central to the crisis. 
Despite these efforts the vast majority of the derivatives 
trade remains OTC. OTC contracts are privately negoti-
ated contracts often tailor made for the buyer. The basic 
derivative forms are forwards, futures, options and swaps. 
Forwards are OTC contracts representing an agreement 
to buy or sell an asset in the future at a given price, the 
‘strike price’. Futures are exchange traded and represent 
an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a specified time 
and price. In both there is a long position and a short 
position, with long hoping the value of the underlying 
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will increase and the short hoping the opposite. Options 
provide the right to buy (‘call’) or sell (‘put’) an underly-
ing asset, but not an obligation to do so. The seller of an 
option is obliged to sell or buy the asset when the contract 
matures. Swaps allow two parties to exchange cash flows. 
For instance, party A may hold a floating interest rate 
asset and party B a fixed interest rate asset. If party A 
believes interest rates will go down and party B believes 
rates will increase there is a rationale for the swap. No-
tably, while interest rate swaps are the largest part of the 
swaps market, parties can swap income streams based on 
virtually any asset. This is ultimately limited only by the 
contract parties’ imaginations. 
The derivatives industry is the largest in the world. 
The notional value of all OTC contracts at end-December 
2012 was $633 trillion, down from an all-time high of 
$706 trillion at end-June 2011(BIS 2013). It is important 
to note that the derivatives markets actually grew in the 
wake of the crisis, suggesting that those who perceived 
the derivatives trade as a perversion of, or cancerous out-
growth from the ‘real economy’ of production and trade, 
and as such a temporary aberration awaiting an inevita-
ble downfall, may need to revisit their commitment to 
an ideal vision of the economy. Exchange traded deriva-
tives markets are smaller, standing at a notional value of 
$67 trillion at end-June 2013. Notional values reflect the 
value of the underlying asset referenced. For instance, if a 
fixed for floating interest rate swap referenced $1 billion, 
its’ notional value would be $1 billion. However, cash 
flows exchanged between counterparties will represent 
the value of changes to the interest rate on $1 billion. Ac-
cordingly, gross market values record how much it would 
cost to cancel a contract, or how much money is ‘at risk’ 
in a contract, and thus more closely represent the value 
in the markets at any point in time. At end-December 
2012 this figure was $24.7 trillion for the OTC markets 
(Ibid.). To place this in context the combined GDP for 
all OECD countries in 2011 was $38.5 trillion (OECD 
2013). Behind these facts and figures regarding deriva-
tives markets lies qualitative historical change.
In commodifying uncertainty as risk, derivatives 
constitute an evolution in the form of property. Deriva-
tives do not entail direct ownership of an underlying as-
set, but a synthesized ownership of an exposure to the 
performance of ‘attributes of assets’ (Das 2005). This abil-
ity to synthesise an asset is key to the utility of derivatives 
in tax planning. Derivatives permit the construction of 
a position, which mirrors the economics of a position 
in some underlying asset or assets, but does not carry 
the same legal obligations as a position taken directly in 
those assets. Derivatives disaggregate assets, so that, for 
instance, ownership of a corporate bond is split between 
an exposure to the currency of the bond’s denomination 
(currency derivative), exposure to a changing interest rate 
environment (interest rate derivative) and exposure to the 
risk that the issuer of the bond will default (credit default 
swap). One way of thinking this through is to consider 
derivatives as the manifestation of a third stage in own-
ership (Bryan and Rafferty 2006: 71-77; Wigan 2009). 
The category of property is important in understand-
ing derivatives. Firstly, at base property is a politically 
defined and invidious mechanism of control. Secondly, in 
this context, the relationship between derivatives and tax 
constitutes a confrontation between two forms of prop-
erty; tax is the property of the state, derivatives the prop-
erty of the market participant. When risk and property 
are married in derivatives the object of appropriation lies 
in a new arena and takes a new form. Under industrial 
capitalism, property and production were intrinsically 
entwined. In contrast, derivatives appropriate aspects of 
circulation and afford the control over those dimensions 
of assets that are valorised and constituted within circu-
lation. As such the equation of property and derivatives 
transcends a prior conception of property as direct claims 
on the material world. Thorstein Veblen’s (1924) notion 
of ‘absentee ownership’ in the limited liability company, 
marked the opening up of an historical process wherein 
ownership progressively abstracts from the physical ma-
terials underlying it. 
Commonly, ownership is understood to take two 
forms. First, that of direct private ownership, where the 
worker is separated from owning the means of produc-
tion and there is no separation between ownership and 
management (Kay 1982). Owner-managers have but one 
means to compete and the liquidation of the owner-man-
ager’s relationship to the entity is difficult and expensive. 
When, for instance, a private company loses a dominant 
competitive position the owner must sell the entire capi-
tal of the enterprise to re-invest in another activity. The 
flexibility of ownership here is considerably encumbered 
by a very real physicality. This contrasts with the second 
stage of ownership. Ownership through equity in the 
public form of the joint stock company, Veblen’s ‘absen-
tee ownership’ (1924), involves the transfer of ownership 
on the stock market between numerous and dispersed 
owners one step removed from the underlying produc-
tive process. Through shares, ownership is separated from 
capital, which in the form of the corporation is given the 
legal form of a person, persona res. In an evolutionary 
institutionalist conception of path dependent but open 
ended historical change (Hodgson 1999) the centre of 
capitalist competition gravitated from the production 
process to processes of circulation, or at least processes 
of circulation begin to define the competitive outcome 
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of ownership in tandem with the productive process. 
The capitalist investor can easily compare the returns on 
an investment against the returns on all other similar 
forms of investment and can adjust a portfolio rapidly 
to beat the average. ‘[T]here is no place in Big Business 
for considerations of a more material sort or of a more 
sentimental sort than net gain within the law. It moves 
on that plane of make-believe on which the net gain is a 
more convincing reality than productive work or human 
livelihood’ (Veblen 1924: 217).
Derivatives as a third form of ownership take a dis-
tinctly different form. As a second level of abstraction 
from the underlying capital, derivatives ownership is 
disconnected from any direct ownership of physical as-
sets, equity or debt3. Indeed, this is the very essence of a 
derivative; ownership takes a form whereby a leveraged 
exposure to an asset is not predicated on, or limited by, 
the direct ownership of that asset. It can be synthesized. 
For instance, a credit derivative, which offers exposure 
to a firm’s performance as debtor – how likely they are 
to cough up - represents the synthetic ownership of that 
firm’s debt, shorn of other exposures, such as the market 
interest rate, embodied in a corporate bond. The value 
of a derivative is determined by movements in the value 
of the underlying share, bond, currency, or index while 
bestowing no rights or obligations in regard to the un-
derlying entities. While, the ownership of firms through 
public equity bridged a division between production and 
circulation, derivatives render that binary itself problem-
atic in certain terms. The ownership afforded by deriva-
tives rests in circulation unencumbered by direct ties to 
underlying assets.
Each stage in the evolution of property marks the 
progressive development of the liquidity and fungibility 
of ownership (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). In the first stage 
ownership (and labour) escapes the straitjacket of feudal 
rights and obligations to be embodied in firms. This is a 
necessary precondition of liquid ownership and market 
competition. Ownership must function solely in terms of 
profit seeking, rather than any alternative value such as 
kinship or status in feudal hierarchy. In this form owner-
ship is liquid in that firms are compelled to compete or 
fold. In the form of the joint stock company, equity own-
ership is separate from control over production. Through 
shareholding investors obtained a fungible and imma-
nently fleeting form of property. In this context owner-
ship revolves around a share in a company’s performance. 
That performance is gauged against a market average and 
shares are bought and sold on secondary markets as the 
owner attempts to ‘beat the average’. Ownership now sits 
between two poles, at one end of which is a particular re-
lation to a company, and the other a more generic relation 
to accumulation in terms of a claim in the secondary stock 
market. Here, the owner’s legal position bestows upon 
her no material claim on company property. In the third 
stage, ownership becomes unencumbered by any linear 
relationship to specific underlying productive or com-
mercial activity. Derivatives render property eminently 
fungible. Switching between assets, asset forms and legal 
jurisdictions is easy and changing the timing of receipts 
and exposures is integral to the derivative form. As such, 
derivatives propel the further abstraction of ownership 
from its ‘real economic’ basis and lend ownership a truly 
universal character and novel capacities. 
Most importantly in this context, the fungibility and 
liquidity of ownership via derivatives and the switching 
and synthesizing functions this affords render deriva-
tives attritional of the fiscal efficacy of the state. Indeed, 
derivatives effectively transcend legal categories and po-
litical geography by integrating them within a contract. 
When fiscal claims are based on stable categories of asset 
identity, ownership, jurisdictional competence and tim-
ing, derivatives challenge fiscal efficacy. The next section 
outlines why derivatives might serve these switching and 
synthesizing functions and in doing so raises the specter 
of capital transcending the fiscal state. 
The Alchemy of Financial Equivalence
Derivatives challenge fiscal efficacy via the capacity to 
transform when a fiscal claim is applicable (timing) where 
that fiscal claim should be applied (source) and to what 
the fiscal claim is applied (income character or asset iden-
tity). These capacities are exercised through the ability 
of derivatives to permit contract parties to synthetically 
replicate the economics of a position, without taking on 
the legal form of that position. Simply, a position on a 
bond can be synthesized through a position in equity 
options by entering into put and call contracts. In this 
example the value of the bond, which will be replicated 
is 100. The put and the call are written so that the inves-
tor has a right to sell at a given fixed price and buy at a 
given fixed price at the same time. If the underlying eq-
uity moves below 100 the investor can exercise the put at 
100. If the equity moves above 100, the call written with 
a strike price of 100 will be exercised and the investor will 
receive 100. In effect a position on a fixed income asset 
(one that returns a predefined sum, such as the bond) has 
been replicated by a put and a call. The put and call as 
opposed to providing fixed returns, provide the investor 
with contingent returns. A position with fixed returns 
and one with contingent returns may be taxed differ-
ently. Consequently, an investor can choose a preferred 
tax exposure. Further, a swap allows an investor to switch 
between asset forms and where an asset is located provid-
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ing the investor a choice of where tax is due and on what. 
Of course tax rates vary across jurisdictions and asset 
types. Indeed, this legal-geographical differentiation is 
the grounds upon which the transforming, synthesizing 
and switching functions of derivatives perform. Further, 
source, timing and character rules apply differently for 
equity, debt, options, forwards and swaps but these con-
tracts can be recombined in various ways to produce the 
returns of any underlying asset. Derivatives ‘turbo charge 
tax shelters’ (Sheppard 1999) because they afford the abil-
ity to replicate the commercial outcome of a transaction 
without entering the transaction and incurring the tax 
exposure associated with such a transaction. This section 
outlines the challenges posed by derivatives to categories 
of timing, source, character and identity and explains, 
on an elementary basis, the mechanics of switching and 
synthesizing which permit this. The examples given are 
elementary, but they represent the basic building blocks 
of derivative based tax arbitrage.
A core fiscal principle is the determination of when an 
item of income or expense becomes subject to tax. This 
matters because of the time value of money. A taxpayer 
is likely to prefer to pay €100 in two years than pay €100 
tomorrow. In a situation where a tax charge arises on the 
basis of a triggering event such as an asset sale, it is pos-
sible via a derivative structure to replicate the pay off from 
the asset sale without making the sale. In effect, income 
can be realized but tax will not be. This is a function of 
constructing an artificial sale and postponing a real sale, 
perhaps almost indefinitely. An investor who holds shares 
the price of which has increased may wish to realize that 
profit. If the investor sells the shares a capital gains tax 
will be imposed. On the other hand, an investor could, 
where legally admissible, buy a put option on the equity 
from a bank with a strike price of 100 that matures in 
two years. The current share price is 100. The investor 
then sells a call option with the same strike price and 
maturity. Simultaneously, the investor borrows from the 
counterparty the full value of all the shares owned using 
the shares as collateral for the loan. The end effect is stark. 
The investor realizes gains in the present, but owes no tax 
now. Further due to the options the investor is no longer 
exposed to changes in share value. If the share price is 
higher that 100 when the option matures, the loss on the 
call offsets this gain. If the share price is lower than 100, 
the gain on the put option offsets this loss (Martin and 
Zailer 2001). Eventually the loan will have to repaid, but 
the contract could be renewed nearing maturity.
The manipulation of source rules follows similar 
principles. A foreign investor in equities subject to with-
holding tax on the sale of the equities may turn to an 
equity swap to alter where the income is sourced for tax 
purposes. For instance, returns from an investment in 
U.S. equity by a foreigner will usually be subject to a 
withholding tax of 30%. However, the investor can re-
ceive the same returns through an equity swap in which 
she receives payments from a counterparty if the value 
of the equity increases or dividends are paid and makes 
payments to that counterparty on the basis of interest on 
the value of equity referenced in the swap and in the event 
that the value of the equity declines. The source of the 
income in a swap is based on the residence of the investor, 
while a direct purchase of equity is sourced where that 
purchase is made. If that investor is resident, or registered, 
in an offshore jurisdiction income from the swap may be 
subject to no tax at all (Levin 2012: 5-6). By artificially 
replicating a desired equity position a foreign investor can 
receive the economic benefits of direct ownership without 
the fiscal obligations attached to it. 
Central to fiscal systems and the character of assets 
for tax purposes is the distinction between income and 
capital, with income usually taxed at a higher rate than 
capital gains. Derivatives can transform ownership of an 
asset from one to the other. Warren (1993) outlines how 
this can be achieved. As noted, the basis of modern fi-
nance theory is that any asset can be replicated with a 
combination of put and call options on another asset or 
assets. When assets with fixed returns, like a bond, are 
taxed as income but those with a contingent return, such 
as a share, are taxed as capital, an investor is incentiv-
ized to replicate the position on a bond via a position in 
equity combined with put and call options. The investor 
produces a synthetic zero coupon bond (a bond that pays 
yield only on maturity), which pays £110 in 2 years. To 
replicate this position in assets with contingent returns, 
returns that will be taxed at the lower income tax rate, the 
investor buys a share of the same value and two options, 
enacting what is termed ‘put-call parity’. The first option 
is a put, a right to sell a share at a specified time, 2 years, 
for a specific price, £110. The second option is a call, 
obliging the investor to sell a share at a specified time, 2 
years, for a specific price, £110. If the share price is below 
£110 in 2 years the investor will exercise the put and ‘put’ 
the shares to the market at £110. If the share price is above 
£110 in 2 years, the holder of the call option will exercise 
that option and pay the investor £110. The investor has 
thus replicated a risk free position in a bond. As such the 
investor will be taxed on these assets as capital rather than 
income. A tax inspector would need to combine the three 
separate contracts to recognize this equivalence.
Hybrid instruments blend features of debt and equity. 
Different jurisdictions will treat an instrument as debt 
or equity depending on local rules for doing so. Firms 
that make cross border investments can take advantage 
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of this identity based differential tax treatment. For ex-
ample, a U.S. firm may make an investment in a subsidi-
ary that issues a hybrid instrument from Luxembourg. 
That subsidiary will make payments to the U.S. based 
parent. In Luxembourg, since the hybrid instrument is 
characterized as debt, the subsidiary will be afforded tax 
deductions on the interest it pays for the debt and no 
withholding tax will be levied on those payments as they 
exit the jurisdiction. However, in the U.S. that payment is 
not recorded as interest income, but as dividend income, 
which is subject to less tax (JCT 2011; Johannesen 2012). 
In the example of a convertible bond, an issuer may sell 
a bond with an in-built trigger dictating that when the 
issuer’s share price reaches a certain level, the bond is 
converted into a certain number of shares. This raises the 
issue of whether the instrument should be characterized 
as debt or equity for tax purposes. The instrument pro-
vides the issuer with deductions on interest paid, while 
reducing the level of that interest on the basis of the 
value imputed to the contingent position on the stock. 
That the same instrument in another jurisdiction may be 
treated as equity implies that interest that is deductible in 
the offshore jurisdiction will not lead to taxable interest 
income in the second jurisdiction where the instrument 
is treated as equity. This is a case of ‘double non-taxation’.
The UK Public Accounts Committee held a hear-
ing in 2012 investigating the marketing of tax avoidance 
schemes (UK PAC 2013). Evidence was provided by the 
Directors of three firms specializing in the sale of ‘tax 
mitigation schemes’; Tax Trade, Future Capital Partners 
and Ingenious Media. These witnesses stated that they 
relied upon legal opinions of highly ranked barristers, 
Queen’s Counsel (QC), to ratify the legality of schemes 
they sold. Rex Bretten, then recently retired from the 
London firm Tax Chambers, was named as one of a hand-
ful of QCs who ‘prostitute themselves’ to schemes devised 
to create ‘tax relief ’. Somewhat ironically, Rex Bretten 
four months subsequently had an appeal against Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) decision not 
to allow him to claim tax relief on a £475,000 loss on an 
avoidance scheme of his own devising quashed. In Febru-
ary 2003, Bretten with family members had become trus-
tees of two trusts set up by Oakwood Consultants, owned 
by a firm of accountants. Oakwood exchanged loan notes 
with a face value for £500,000 with Bretten in return for 
£500,000. The loan notes were constructed to be redeem-
able for £25,000 15 days after issue, thereby creating the 
tax-deductible loss. However, the scheme included a call 
option on the notes held by one of the trustees, which 
could be redeemed 9 days after issue and before the 15th 
day of issue for 99.5% face value. This option was exer-
cised resulting in one of the trusts holding £499,500 and 
liability on the loan notes held by the other trust (UK 
FTT 189: 2013). HMRC deemed the scheme wholly ar-
tificial and therefore disallowed the tax-deductible loss on 
the notes. This case reveals both actors central derivative 
driven tax avoidance and the simplicity of some of these 
schemes. Not all are so simple.
In 2013 the CEO of the UK bank Barclays stated in 
interview, „There are some areas that relied on sophisti-
cated and complex structures, where transactions were 
carried out primarily to access the tax benefits. Although 
this was legal, going forward such activity is incompatible 
with our purpose. We will not engage in it again“ (BBC 
2013). The Structured Capital Markets division reportedly 
contributed as much as £1bn a year to Barclays’ profits by 
selling complex structured products which had the effect 
of reducing tax charges or providing artificial deductions 
– accounting items that can be set against taxes due (Law-
rence 2013). Project Knight, one of six such structures 
revealed by the UK’s Guardian newspaper in 2009 and 
subsequently leaked on wikileaks, involved a proposed 
‘tax efficient’ replication of a loan between Barclays UK 
and BB&T U.S. (Guldberg, Hinrichsen and Nielsen 
2013). Barclays first set up a UK holding company with 
approximately $4bn. The UK holding company then in-
vests this sum in a Luxembourg holding company. The 
Luxembourg company invests in a further UK limited 
partnership. The UK limited partnership lends money to 
BB&T, but since the UK partnership legally received the 
money from Luxembourg no tax is due on the profits in 
either the UK or Luxembourg. Barclays in theory would 
need to hold capital against the credit risk of the loan, 
but by writing a credit default swap and a call option on 
the loan this cost and the risk associated with the loan 
is avoided. In turn BB&T set up three subsidiaries in 
Delaware and one in the UK in which it invested ap-
proximately $1.3bn. This subsidiary invests the money 
in the UK subsidiary, which has received $4bn from the 
Barclay’s subsidiary. After three years the deal is wound 
up. The structure as presented here is deceptively simple. 
There are many more steps involved (see Keeley 2007). 
However, this reduced explanation shows how derivatives 
can be used in tailoring cross-border products to mini-
mise fiscal exposures. By doing so, and routing the series 
of transactions through offshore jurisdictions in the U.S 
and Europe Barclays could provide a loan to BB&T at 
below market rate levels and avoid taxation on its profits. 
Everyone but the taxman is a winner. A comprehensive 
review of the use of derivatives in tax planning concludes 
that ‘derivatives are appealing because they can replicate 
financial positions, blur economic substance, and intro-
duce considerable ambiguity in tax reports’ and refers 
to an annual $100bn lost to the U.S. Inland Revenue 
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Service due to corporate use of derivatives in tax planning 
(Donohue 2012). 
Conclusion
At first glance, the relationship between derivatives and 
taxation seems to exemplify the regulatory arbitrage so 
often associated with financial innovation. These associa-
tions are not misplaced and sit well with those who might 
corral the analysis of derivatives within an idealized and 
somewhat static vision of capitalism and therefore con-
sider derivatives a cancerous outgrowth from some as-
sumed ideal type political economy. Derivatives have 
been used to avoid or minimize the impact of regulatory 
impositions, including those of the fiscal state. However, 
regulatory arbitrage is a symptom of deeper change driven 
by derivatives and contemporary financial innovation. 
Derivatives require us to confront extant concepts of capi-
tal and even dismantle nationally framed conceptions. As 
we have seen, distinct concepts such as equity and capital 
can be collapsed inside a derivative form. In turn, fiscal 
architectures are constructed on an imaginary in which 
capital in all its forms bears a linear relationship to place 
(source), identity (income character and asset) and time 
(recognition for tax purposes). Derivatives destabilize 
these categories through their switching and synthesising 
functions. What is equity can be capital, what is taxable 
as income can become subject tax as capital, what is taxed 
in one jurisdiction can be taxed (differently) in another. 
This capacity to destabilize both concepts of capital and 
regulatory architectures built upon such concepts points 
to the historic import of the derivative form. Capital has 
transcended the fiscal state and our intellectual means 
of its appropriation. Desperate attempts to reregulate fi-
nance in the wake of the GFC have failed to address this 
substantial issue and tackling derivatives and tax avoid-
ance continues to rely upon a game of cat and mouse 
between revenue authorities, the courts and the creators 
of fiscally attritional financial products. 
This article has provided an elementary introduction 
to why this might be so based on the notion that deriva-
tives are eroding the tax collecting ability of the state. 
Further research is necessary, but some limitations on 
that project should be highlighted. First, the precise way 
in which derivatives are used to ‘optimize’ tax exposures 
is subject to a process of constant revision and innovation. 
The researcher is only aware of mechanisms that have 
been revealed by leaks or court cases. Secondly, more 
complex structures are a compound of myriad contracts, 
which will be reported or accounted for as distinct items. 
When it is the aggregate effect off a basket of contracts 
that provides the ‘optimal’ tax position, this cannot be 
identified without insider knowledge. In turn, insider 
knowledge is heavily guarded and access to key players 
in banks, accountancy firms and law extremely limited. 
Fourth, the issue requires knowledge in diverse fields; 
accounting, law, political economy, financial engineering 
and international and national fiscal and financial regula-
tions all bear on the question. Fifth, tax optimization will 
rarely rely on one tool. Strategies will combine derivatives 
with idiosyncratic national rules, opportunities within 
corporate law and accounting conventions. Interaction 
across these domains is key. Isolating the effect of one 
is difficult. This said, the issue does open up a host of 
avenues to pursue. How does the process of tax driven 
innovation within banks proceed? Who are the main ac-
tors involved and how do they interact? Can national and 
international fiscal rules intersect efficiently in this con-
text? Is the transcendence argued for here limited to the 
derivative or might the digital economy and the increas-
ingly intangible nature of capital be generating similar 
historical outcomes? What concepts of capital, fiscal or 
otherwise, might be adequate to the derivative form?
notes
1. The term ‘tax haven’ is highly contested and politicised. Almost 
any state can act as a haven from another’s fiscal claim and many 
states not commonly understood as ‘tax havens’, such as the UK or 
Netherlands, design fiscal regimes that attract mobile capital on the 
basis of tax advantages. 
2. Structured finance describes a range of highly complex products 
sold to companies with bespoke financing requirements. Struc-
tured products are built with derivatives and derivative pricing 
techniques.
3. Commons (1934) distinguishes corporeal or physical assets, incor-
poreal or paper assets, and intangible or strategic assets. Derivatives 
might bridge incorporeal and intangible assets or collapse the dis-
tinction between the two. This is more likely thinking through the 
relationship between derivatives and tax.
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